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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
8TATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs
BYRON SCHULTZ,

Case
No.

12751

Defendant and Appellant

APPELLANTS BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
An appeal from conviction of a charge of illegal sale
of narcotics.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a jury verdict against appellant, he was sentenced to a term of not less than five years in the Utah
State Prison, where he is presently serving the sentence
of the Court.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
..Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the lower Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The factual background of this ca::.;e is not involved
and, to a great extent, not disputed.
Appellant had been living in Salt Lake City with his
wife and family for some six months (R-185) and working at Ketchums Builders Supply there (R-175). On
May 17, 1971, he came to Ogden on the bus with his wife
and child to visit his mother (R-176). After arriving in
Ogden in the afternoon, he purchased some wine and
they walked to the Ogden Municipal park to visit acquaintances they had known (R-177).
At about the same time Ogden City undercover
policeman Philip Roche, in plain clothes and an unmarked car, approached the park with an informer named
Gary Spangler (T-67-69). Roche had set up a meeting
with a known dealer, Patrick Barnes, and had arranged
with Spangler to solicit a sale from Barnes for purposes
of prosecution (R-141, 142).
Unfortunately for appellant, Barnes did not show
for the appointment (R-141). Spangler was not available to testify; all three officers testifying had no knowledge of his whereabouts at the time of trial. Therefore
the sole evidence of what happened at the initial encounter between appellant and the police informant
came from appellant (R-177):

"Q. What happened after you got here1
A. I was approached by this, I forget his name,
the one that was with Roche.
Q. Where were you at the time'?
2

A. Gary Spangler, I believe. I was at the park
talking to my friends.
Q. What happened when you were approached 7
What was said 1
A. This certain Gary Spangler wanted to know
where he could purchase some heroin and he
looked to me as if he were a heroin addict.
So I checked around. I was going to do him
a favor. I checked around and found Terry
Ebaugh and asked him if Mr. Gary Spangler could purchase some heroin from him.
rrhen I made the transaction with the money,
because Ebaugh was kind of afraid."
The approach by Spangler, although not witnessed
by Roche (or anyone else) was nevertheless confirmed
by him (R-141).

"Q. The purpose of Mr. Spangler going in the
park was in effect to solicit t'he sale of a narcotic drug, I take iU
A. Yes, from the individual who didn't show
up."

Following the conversation with Spangler, appellant
asked around the park until he located someone who said
he had a supply of heroin and would sell it. This was
one Terry Ebaugh, who also could not be located by
subpoena to testify. By stipulation (R-192) the jurors
\Vere instructed that if in fact he were present and sworn
·as a witness, he would refuse to testify on grounds of
self incrimination.
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After locating this source, appellant reported back
to Spangler and by him was taken to the car wher·e
Roche was waiting. Roche was surprised when Spangler brought him over and the conversation they held was
brief because the purchase was already set up by Spangler. (R-141).
After talking with Roche, appellant took $20.00 from
him, walked back in the park, gave the money to Ebaugh,
received the two packets of heroin (supposedly) and
within one minute came back and delivered them to
Roche. (R-143, 180). Appellant told both Roche and
Spangler that he would have to make the buy from another person (R-178):

"Q. Now, what was said when you arrived there1
A. Well, Spangler told him that I could get some
heroin for him and then Roche gave me the
money.
Q. How much did he give you 1
A. Twenty Dollars.
Q. What did you tell him, if anything1
A. That this Terry Ebaugh had some. He asked
me if I could go get it. Then I went and got
it for him and brought the heroin back.
Q. All right, now, tell us who is Terry Ebaugh 1
A. He is a guy that hangs around the park, I
didn't know him that well. I checked around
and asked who had some heroin because this
certain person wanted it, and I asked Terry
Ebaugh and he told me that he had some."
Appellant received nothing from 'l1erry Ebaugh for
the sa'le ( R-180, 183) :
4

"Q. You gave the twenty dollars to Terry
Ebaugh?
A. Yes.
Q. And, you got nothing from Mr. Ebaugh¥
A. No."
"Q. Officer Roche told you he would like to score
on some heroin, some
A. (Nodding his head up and down.)
Q. And, you know that selling heroin is a serious
A. Yes Sir.
Q. And yet, out of the goodness of your heart,
because he looked like an addict, Officer
Roche looked like an
A. (Nodding his head up and down.)
Q. You decided to do him this favor and go find
someone who could score him on some
A. Right. Have you ever seen, excuse me."
Roche then delivered the suspected material to the
chain of command, and it eventually ended with the
State chemist, who testified it consisted of 100 m.g. (Milligrams) of whitish material, 16.5% morphine and .5 per
cent codeine. (R-124, 125 ).
After several days lapse, appellant was arrested on
a charge of violation of 58-13a-44 (8) U.C.A. 1953, Trial
was held Octo her 12th and 13th, 1971, resulting in this
appeal.
The State rested (R-151) and after argument for a
dismissal by appellant, the State was permitted to reopen and off er further testimony on the issue of en5

trapment. This was done over objection (R-155) and
consisted of two matters:
Roche, upon recall, testified that on or about May 2,
1971, he purchased four unidentified tablets from appellant for $8.00 and they turned out to be completely negative from a drug standpoint (R 157, 158).
Burnett, a drug task force officer, also was recalled
and began to testify as to a 1969 arrest he assisted in of
appellant for the sale of marijuana. Over objection,
the witness started to testify as to certain rather peripheral matters concerning plea negotiation (R-169);
after further objection the jury was excused and it was
determined this 1969 proceeding had resulted in a dismissal of the charges. The jury was then recalled, and
instructed as follows (R-173):
"THE COURT: Call your jury back in.
(The jury returned to the courtroom).
THE COURT: The parties to the trial are present.
The jury is instructed to disregard any reference
in the testimony or the evidence at all concerning the arrest in 1969. As far as the Court is
aware the matter was dismissed in his favor, in
the defendant's favor, so you may disregard that
entirely unless you think it has some implication
in Mr. Schultz favor. Otherwise disregard it in
this case."
Appellant again moved
denied (R-174).

for dismissal, which was

After completion of the evidence, instructions to the
6

jury and arguments of counsel, the jury retired to consider its verdict. On two occasions, the jury interrupted
its deliberations to request amplification of the Court's
instructions on entrapment. Each time the Trial judge
orally gave further instructions on the subject (R 216,
222). Appellant objected each time, not to the procedure itself, but to the substance of the oral instructions ( R 218, 222). After some five hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of selling a
narcotic drug as charged in the information (R-224).
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE.
THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPIMENT WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT TWO.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY IN THE ISSUE OF ENTRAPMENT.
As these two points are closely related they will for
convenience be argued together. The general principles
of this defense are well known and recognized:
"The whole doctrine derives from a spontaneous
moral revulsion against using the powers of government fo beguile innocent, through ductile, persons into lapses which they might otherwise resist."
United States v. Becker, 62 F. 2d 1007.
The original definitive opinion on the issue of entrapment, Sorrells
United States of America, 287

7

U.S. 435, held that an accused was entitled to the defense
of entrapment, and stated these general guide lines:

"It is well settled that the fact that officers or
employees of the Government merely afford opportunities of facilities for the commission of the
offense does not defeat the prosecution. Artifice
and stratagem may be employed to catch those
engaged in criminal enterprises. (cases citedJ.
The appropriate object of this permitted activity,
frequently essential to the enforcement of the
law, is to reveal the criminal design; to expose
publication, the
the illicit traffic, the
fraudulent use of the mails, the illegal conspiracy,
or other offenses, and thus to disclose the would
be violators of the law. A different question is
presented when the criminal design originates
with the officials of the Government, and they
implant in the mind of an innocent person the
disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute."
This opinion was affirmed in Sherman vs United
States of America 356 U.S. 369, 2L, Ed2 848, 78 S. Ct.
819. In holding the accused innocent as a matter of
law, the Supreme Court said:
"However, the fact that government agents
'merely afford opportunities or facilities for the
commission of the offense does not' constitute entrapment. Entrapment occurs only when the
criminal conduct was 'the product of the creative
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activity' of law-enforcement officials. (Emphasis
supplied.) See 287 U.S. at 441, 451. To determine whether entrapment has been established, a
line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary
criminal. The principles by whieh the courts are
to make this determination were outlined in Sorrells. On the one hand, at trial the accused may
examine the conduct of the government agent;
and on the other hand, the accused will be subjected to an 'appropriate and searching inquiry
into his own conduct and predisposition' as bearing on his claim of innocence. See 287 US at 451."

z

Utah has
this defense in State vs Pacheco. 13 U.2 148, 369 P.2 494:
"For a peace officer to procure a person to commit a crime, which he otherwise would not have
committed, for the purpose of apprehending and
prosecuting him is entrapment. This is so discordant to the true function of law enforcement
which is the prevention, not the causation, of
crime; and so repugnant to fundamental concepts of justice that the conviction of an accused
under such circumstances will not be approved."
This opinion has been enhanced by State vs Perkins,
19 U.2 421, 432 P.2d 50, affirming Pacheco and holding
evidence of prior sales admissible to prove predisposition.
There is no conflict in the evidence as to solicitation of the crime hy the police agent. The question
then, is whether there was sufficient evidence of pre9

disposition to commit the crime on the part of appellant to avoid a ruling of entrapment as a matter of law.
Initially the State made no effort in this area and was
content to rest with simply the stark evidence of the
sale itself. Only after being confronted by a motion
to dismiss did the State bestir itself and over objection
offered the testimony of Roche and Burnett as to prior
dealings. The evidence of Burnett we need not consider
as the trial Court directed the jury to disregard it and
this ruling has not been appealed by the State. The
evidence of Roche is similarly without probative value
as it concerned a disputed sale of a non-narcotic substance.
Many courts have held that in such situations the
State has not met its burden to show the intent to
commit the crime originated with the defendant, rather
than with the police officer. Gray v. State, Indiana
1967, 231 N .E. 2d 793 is such a ca:se. In reversing a
conviction for sale of a narcotic, the Indiana court
quoted Sorrells at lenght and held:
"Where the evidence shows, as in this case, that
there was a plan devised by law enforcement
officers to reveal a violation of the criminal
law and such law enforcement officers participate actively in the transaction which is declared
to be illegal, without further proof the evidence
shows merely that it was the scheme, the idea,
and the plan which originated with law enforcement .officers. There must be in such instances
evidence which will rebut that the illegal transaction was induced solely by the plan of the law
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enforcement officers, since the burden of proof
is on the State and does not shift to the defendant. The evidence must show that the illegal
transaction was actually that of the appellant
and not that of the law enforcement officials
or informer who was acting at the instigation
of the law enforcement officials.
"Here we have no evidence whatever that this
appellant, before he was approached by this
informant, had been engaged in the sale of heroin
or that he had any intent to make a sale before
he was asked to do so by a plan of law enforcement officers. The evidence further shows that
a search of the appellant and the search of his
home immediately following the sale :revealed
no other heroin in his possession and no $10.00
in his possession. Possession of a supply of
heroin beyond the two capsules sold might :raise
an inference that he kept the supply for the purpose of sale. If law enforcement officers use a
scheme or plan to disclose illegal activities of
one charged with a crime, then they must also
bring forward evidence to show that that party
was not innocently lured and enticed to commit
the illegal act."
United States i;s Owens, 228 F. Supp. 300 (1964)
while different
in that considerable evidence
of inducement was present, also dealt with the issue of
absence of evidence of previous crimes:
"the sale made by defendant ... was induced by
a Government undercover agent ... and that there
11

is no evidence to show that defendant was predisposed to commit the offense. Agent Turnbou
had seen no prior sale by defendant, and he knew
of no such sale ... Defendant had merely been
seen in the company of other users and some
sellers - but such association is not sufficient to
indicate a predisposition to sell narcotics."
The Trial Court refused Appellant's requested instruction No. 11, and exception to this ruling was taken
(T-125) and argued at some length. 'l'his request in
substance says that before the police can legally entrap
a defendant, they must have reasonable grounds to
believe the defendant is engaged in that particular
type of illegal activity. This requirement has been
recognized in a series of federal cases, and specifically
applied to a narcotics case by our own TenthCircuit
in Ryles v. United States, 10th C.C.A. 183 F. 2d 944.
In that case the sale (as in our case) was made to a
"decoy" who represented to the defendant he was a
user and suffering from a lack of narcotics. The trial
court's instruction was in part as follows:
"the burden is upon the government to prove
by competent evidence to the satisfaction of the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt that it was not
entrapment. You are therefore instructed that
if you find from the evidence and heyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a reputation
for selling narcotics and that the officers of
government had reasonahle grounds to believe
he was engaged in selling narcotics and in good
faith sought to obtain evidence of
violations,
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you should convict the defendant as to each count
of the indictment if you further find beyond a
reasonable doubt that he made the sales as charged.'"
The Circuit Court approved the instruction, affirming the conviction, and stated:
''It is well recognized that officers may entrap
one into the commission of an offense only when
they have reasonable gronnds to believe that he
is engaged in unlawful activities. They may not
initiate the intent and purpose of the violation.
In a case of entrapment, it is incumbent on the
government to prove reasonable grounds to beli·eve that the intent and purpose to violate the
law existed in the mind of the accused." Mitchell
vs. U. S. 10 Cir. 143 F. 2d 953, 957. (Italics
Added).
In the .Mitchell case, our Circuit cited with approval
C. M. Spring Drug Co. vs. United States, 12 F. 2d 852:
"It is well settled by the decisions of the Supreme
Oourt of the United States, we think now universally followed in the several circuits, that, where
the government, through its agents, has reasona;ble cause to believe that the law is being viola!ted by the defendant, they may legally entrap
the defendant hy decoy letters or by pretended
purchases."
'Ne think this approach reasonable, fair and essential to the proper objectives of law enforcement. The
efforts of the task force on drugs should be directed
at convictions of the known, or reasonably suspected,
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dealers in the drug traffic. Then and only then; should
agents be aUowed to induce or solicit illegal sales for
the purpose of prosecution. In a case such as this,
where from all the evidence it was an ins'Olated transaction, this Court should protect the unwary innocent
who is solicited by the undercover agent. The distinction was well recognized by this court in the early
case of Salt Lake City vs. Robinson, 40 U. 448, 125
Pac. 657:
"While it may be conceded that the particular
sale in question here would not have been made
if the two officers had not asked to purchase the
liquor, yet in view of the facts and circumstances the appellant was no more induced to make
this sale than he would be induced to make any
sale in his place of business. More'Over, the sale
in question was seemingly only one of many that
appellant was prepared to make. When the intoxicating liquor was called for by the officers,
appellant seemed to have a stock of it on hand
from which he could supply any reasonable demand. In case the officers had called for intoxicating liquor and had been informed by appellant that he did not have it for sale, or that
he did not keep it in stock, and in such event they
had induced him to obtain some for them from
some one else, which he did, and after it was so
procured upon their solicitation he had sold what
he had procured the case would be different. Here,
however, the sale was freely and voluntarily
made from a supply which apparently was on
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hand in appellant's store and which could have
been kept on hand only for the purposes of making sales to those who desired to purchase. While
it is true that one sale constitutes the offense,
yet it is clear that it was not the purpose of the
officers to induce the a'Ppellant to make a sale
for the sole purpose of convicting him of making
that sale, but it se,ems their object was to obtain
evidence from which it was made manifest that
appellant was engaged in the illegal traffic of
intoxicating liquors and that they desired to
break up such traffic." (Italics added).
The most recent Utah Law Review, Volume 1971,
No. 2, has a penetrating comment on the position of
some authorities that entrapment is a matter of due
process for the Court to decide, rather than a factual
issue of intent for the jury. As this article, beginning at page 266, and the Grossman case it springs
from were not before the Trial Oourt, appellant does
not here assert them other than as background for the
decision in this case. We heartily endorse the authors
concluding sentence:
"No court can deny that entrapment-like conduct is abhorrent; there is no reason, therefore,
to administer the defense in any other fashion
than a cons1titutionally uniform standard that
operates to restrain such conduct before it occurs."
The critical nature of this issue is reflected by the
first inquiry of the jury following several hours of
deliberation (R-216):
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OLSEN: We haven't reached a unanimous verdict, and we would like to have a little
clarification of your interpretation 'Of the law
of entrapment. Do you want me to go further?
"FOREMAN OLSEN: I would like to say, in
the use of the law of entrapment is it possible
or is it right for one of the law officers to
this entrapment when a pers on has not been
proven, you know, guilty of a criminal charge.
"THE COURT: Before?
"FORE.MAN OLSEN: Before."
1

The Court, following the second inquiry of the jury
for clarification ref'lected as follows (R-220):
"THE COURT: What they want, what I think
tihey want to know in substance can a man be
entrapped in his first offense. I think he probably can."
This presents the heart of our argument - can the
police agencies, without any reason, solicit the commission of crime from the man in the street, and prosecute him when he
Appellant submits such a concept is contrary to our system of justice, and the statements made by this court in previous entrapment cases.
POINT III. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO
AN ACQUITTAL AS A MATTER OF
LAW BECAUSE HE WAS ACTING AS
AGENT FOR THE POLICE OFFICER,
ROCHE.
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
REFUSING '11 0 INSTRUCT ON APPELLANTS AGENCY THEORY.

16

Appellant took the position during trial that as he
performed the prohibited act at the request of Roche,
he was in fact the agent of Roche and therefore not
guilty. This issue was presented (other than in argument) by appellant's requested instructions 8 and 9.
Exception was taken to the Court's refusal to so instruct, and to the instruction given by the Trial Court
on aiding and abetting.
The "agency" theory here defended has impressive support.
United States v Prince, 3rd C.C.A., 264 F. 2d 850, approved without qualification the following instruction:
"If you believe that the Federal Agent (Charles
G. Hill) or the informer, who acted under instructions and authority of agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, asked the defendant
to get some heroin for him and thereupon the
defendant undertook to act in the prospective
purchaser's behalf rather than his own, and in
so doing purchased the drug from a third person with whom he was not associated in selling,
and thereafter delivered it to the buyer, the defendant would not be a seller and could not be
convicted under this indictment."
In Adams vs United States, 5th C.C.A., 220 F. 2d
297, the Circuit reversed a narcotics sale conviction and
directed a verdict of acquittal:

"We find it unnecessary to consider all of the
specifications of error, since we believe that the
appellant's motion for acquittal should have been

17

granted. We think that no reasonable jury could
fail on this evidence to entertain a reasonable
doubt that the appellant sold the heroin as alleged. In United States vs Sawyer, 3 Cir., 210
F. 2d 169, the evidence as to the part played by
the defendant in the transaction was conflicting,
but the trial court refused to include in his charge
an explanation as to the difference between dealing with a purchaser as seller and acting for
him as a procuring agent. The Court held that
this was error, and in reversing for a new trial
the court said, 210 F. 2d 170:
'In these circumstances, we think the court should
at least have pointed out to the jury that if they
believed that the Federal agent asked the defendant to get some heroin for him and thereupon
the defendant undertook to act in the prospective
purchaser's behalf rather than his own, and in
so doing purchased the drug from a third person
with whom he was not associated in 'selling, and
thereafter delivered it to the buyer, the defendant would not be a seller and could not be convicted under this indictment. This may be obvious to a lawyer, but we are not sure that in the
circumstances of this case the distinction between
a seller and a procuring agent was equally clear
to laymen. The government having elected to
charge the defendant with the crime of sale
rather than illegal possession, the jury should
have been alerted to the legal limitations of the
sale concept in relation to the circumstances of

18

this case.'
"We agree with this statement of the applicable
legal principle; in the present case, however, there
was no materially conflicting evidence. All of
the evidence was quite consistent with the appellant's acting only as a purchasing agent or messenger instead of as a seller. There was no evidence from which a sale from her to McKinney
could be spelled out beyond a reasonable doubt;
nor was there any evidence that she profited in
any way from the transactions or was associated
with her 'connection' in selling narcotics (except
for the quite equivocal fact of the two purchases
themselves). Therefore, the verdict of guilty of
the offense of selling heroin must have been based
upon speculation, and the court should have directed a verdict of acquittal."
These cases were decided under former 21 U.S.C.
Sec. 174, prohibiting the sale of any narcotic drug. Admittedly this statute did not contain the sweeping definition of "sale" found in 58-13a-1 (10) U.C. A. This
broad definition does not remove the problem, however.
New York and Texas are states that have adopted the
Uniform Narcotic Drug Act (the source of 58-13a-1 (10)
and have answered the question squarely with the Federal Courts.
Durham vs State, Tex 1955. 280 S.W. 2d 737, held
that an accused narcotic seller, who is interested in no
way on behalf of the seller, hut acts only as agent of
the prosecutor, is not guilty of the crime charged.

19

P!eople vs Hingerton, New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, 277 New York Supplement 2d 754
holds:
"Defendant's conviction for violation of the Publice Health Law with respect to narcotic drugs
(Penal Law, Sec. 1751, subd. 1) rests on a single
sale of marijuana to a special employee of the
police department. The Peop'le's proof affirmatively established that defendant acted solely as
an agent of this employee; and failed to show that
he received any financial profit from the transaction or that he was acting in concert with the
actual vendor. Under these circumstances, the
learned trial court should have applied the rule
that 'one who acts solely as the agent of the buyer
cannot be convicted of the crime of selling narcotics' and should have granted defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment (People v Lindsey,
16 A.D. 2d 805, 228 N.Y.S. 2d 427, affd. 12 N. Y.
2d 958, 238 N.Y.S. 2d 956, 189 N.E. 2d 492; People
v. Buster, 286 App. Div. 1141, 145 N.Y.S. 2d 437;
People v. Branch, 13 A.D. 2d 714, 213 N.Y.S. 2d
535; People v. Silverman, 23 A.D. 2d 947, 260 N.
Y.S. 2d 431; United States v. Moses, 3 Cir. 220
F. 2d 166; United States v. Sawyer, 3 Cir. 210 F.
2d 169.):
Smith vs State, Texas 1965, 396 S.W. 2d 876
wrestled specifically with the question of the Uniform
Act definition of "sale".
In affirming Durham, the
court rejected the view of Illinois (People v. Shannon,
20

155 N.E. 2d 578) and New Jersey (State vs Weissman,
179 A. 2 748). In doing so, the T'exas court pointedly
reached the heart of our argument:
"We think that the New York cases and the Durham case are correct and reject the view that one
who acts only as an agent, servant or employee of
a law enforcement officer in the purchase of narcotic drugs for evidence purposes, and who is in
no way connected or associated with the seUer
and receives no financial profit from the single
sale, can be guilty of selling the narcotic drugs
when the law enforcement officer is not." See
United States v. Sawyer, 3 Cir., 210 F. 2d 169;
United States v Moses, 3 Cir., 220 F. 2d 166.
Another state to recently agree with appllant's position is Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Harvard,
1969, 253 N.E. 2d 346. This case cites with approval the
Federal and New York cases we rely on in this brief, and
rejects the Illinois interpretation under the Uniform
Act.
CONCLUSION
The evidence here compels the belief that appellant
was not a narcotic dealer. He was induced to search
out a se'ller and make a purchase from him with money
supplied by the Ogden drug task force offices. He had
no previous narcotics sales, and was not a target of
He had been "going
suspicion in the drug field.
straight", living and working in Salt Lake City. It was
just his misfortune to be at the particular place and time
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when the suspected seller Barnes did not appear. For
the reasons set out, the conviction must be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL
Attorney for Appellant
2324 Adams A venue,
Ogden, Utah 84401
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